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ABSTRACT
This article examines the progress and shortcomings of democratic control of
armed forces (DCAF) reforms in Turkey and seeks to question how Turkey
might be further motivated to implement reforms. It questions official motives
in each reform process and finds two main motives for progress: the prospect
of EU accession and democratization. It finds the motive for the existing
shortcomings as the goal for allowing a degree of authority for military within
DCAF in order to prevent political abuse of military power. Thus it seems that
Turkey might be motivated to overcome these shortcomings only when its
understanding of DCAF details a full subordination of military to civilian
authority.
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Introduction
In democracies, politicians normally have accountability to those who have
elected them. Contrarily, the armed forces do not have a constitutional
accountability to the society. That is why, it is agreed that the authority in
charge of making defense and security policy should only be a democratically
elected civilian authority, not the armed forces.1 Accordingly, the notion of
democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) aims to prevent military influ-
ence in politics and subordinate military to the interests of a democratic
society.2
The European Union (EU) requires that candidate states fulfill certain cri-
terion of political control over military within the context of Copenhagen pol-
itical criteria, since DCAF is directly related to a sustained democracy and rule
of law.3 Despite the lack of a single practice and defined standards, mainly
because of EU’s reluctance to interfere in its members’ way of organizing
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their defense,4 it is still possible to find a general pattern for European under-
standing of DCAF. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) Budapest Declaration had a prominent role in setting institutional
standards of security in Europe.5 In its Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security, three norms are established. The first is on democratic
political control over military, defined in terms of integration of the armed
forces within civil society.6 The second is on constitutionally established auth-
orities vested with democratic legitimacy;7 and the last is on legislative
approval of defense expenditures, defined in terms of transparency and
public access to information related to the armed forces.8
During the accession negotiations, the EU puts forth certain DCAF
requirements to all candidate states, including Turkey. Turkey has shown a
considerable degree of progress on DCAF since 2001. In the literature,
there are several arguments for motives of DCAF reform process in the
country. The most widely accepted motive for progress is the “EU factor,”
namely the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the union, and the efforts to
fulfill the EU requirements for DCAF accordingly.9 Other arguments
include discussions on certain domestic factors in limiting military influence
on politics, besides the EU accession, such as an effective government, stron-
ger public opinion and progress of NGOs.10 There are also studies that focus
on the role of coup plots and the de-legitimizing influence they have had in
curbing the power of the military in Turkish politics.11 However, literature
mainly lacks a systematic analysis of the motives for progress in DCAF
reforms. This article aims to examine systematically the official motives for
reforms by tracing relevant parliamentary minutes of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly (TGNA) during the legislative procedure and the reasoned
decisions of the legislative proposals. Despite the progress in DCAF reform
process, Turkey still has shortcomings considering the EU requirements.
Also, reasons for those shortcomings have not been systematically examined
in the literature. Thus, besides the motives for progress, this article aims to
question the motives for the shortcomings in Turkey’s DCAF reform
process. This way, shorcomings of DCAF in Turkey can be identified.
The article first identifies the EU requirements and criticisms as put forth
in the Commission reports and progress reports. Second, it categorizes them
based on the three norms emphasized in CSCE Budapest Declaration, namely
democratic political control over military, constitutional and legislative struc-
ture to control and guide military and legislative approval of defense expen-
ditures. Third, it examines Turkey’s reform process for the points of EU
requirements and criticisms on Turkey. Last, the article identifies progresses
and shortcomings of the DCAF reform process in Turkey in accordance
with the EU definitions while questioning the official motives systematically.
In conclusion, the article categorizes the DCAF reforms in progresses and
shortcomings together with their official motives. Also, it seeks to answer
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how to initiate a reform process for the existing shortcomings as it has been
done in the progress areas.
By examining relevant parliamentary minutes and reasoned decisions for
legislative proposals, two official motives for progress in DCAF reform
process were identified. The primary motive, as widely argued in the litera-
ture, is the prospect of EU accession. The secondary is the strengthening of
democratic principles such as rule of law and equality before law. Since
DCAF, by definition, is directly related with democratization, the latter
motive appears only natural. Thus, considering that Turkey also has this
“natural” motive besides the “EU factor” seems to be an encouragement for
further progress. Analysis of parliamentary minutes shows that the main
motive for shortcomings in DCAF reforms, which the EU still continues to
criticize, is the goal of protecting authority for military within DCAF. Occu-
pying a central place in Turkish politics, the military has a historical guardian
role for the unitary and secular characteristics of the Republic. This special
role enabled Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to enjoy an autonomous position
such as setting agenda and enlisting mechanisms accordingly.12 Considering
this historical heritage, notion of DCAF in Turkey has the objective of not
only preventing military intervention to political structureas but also protect-
ing military power from the political abuse of insecure and incompetent poli-
ticians.13 According to this understanding, civilian control over military
should allow military “to have a degree of rightful and vested authority
over its internal matters, strategic issues and military doctrine.”14 Thus, exist-
ing shortcomings in DCAF reform process in Turkey is a reflection of the goal
of preserving authority for military while increasing civilian control at the
same time. In other words, Turkey’s understanding of DCAF justifies the
existence of these shortcomings. Analyses of the motives for the shortcomings
seem to support this finding.
In the following sections, this article first examines progresses and short-
comings of DCAF reforms in Turkey. Then it questions official motives in
each reform process from two perspectives: First, identifying the motives
for progress and shortcomings and second providing an answer how
Turkey might be motivated to conduct reforms for the shortcomings as it
has done in other progress areas.
Democratic political control over military
The EU requirements and criticisms on democratic political control over mili-
tary as emphasized in CSCE Budapest Declaration can be analyzed under four
categories. First, the Chief of General Staff (CGS) shall be responsible to Min-
istry of Defense instead of Prime Minister. Second, military representatives
shall withdraw from civilian bodies. Third, decisions of Supreme Military
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Council (SMC) shall be open to judicial review and last, an institution of
Ombudsman with a military oversight mechanism shall be established.
In Turkey, the General Staff and Ministry of Defense are two separate insti-
tutions, assumed to work in coordination. The CGS is appointed by the Pre-
sident and reports to the Prime Minister in the exercise of duties and
powers.15 This has constituted the EU’s first criticism to Turkey:
Civilian control over the military still needs to be improved (… ) Contrary to
EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defense
Minister, [CGS] the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime
Minister.16
Despite the agreement reached by political parties in Turkey in principle on
the drafting of a new constitution that will make CGS accountable to
Defense Minister in 2013,17 the EU continued its criticism in 2014 by
stating “[CGS] continued to report to the PrimeMinister rather than the Min-
istry of Defence.”18 The motive for the agreement on this progress is stated by
the Vice Prime Minister at the time Bekir Bozdağ as “a necessity of
democracy.”19
The second area of criticism was the existence of a military representative,
nominated by the CGS, in the Council of Higher Education (CHE).20 The EU
urged Turkey to implement reforms to effectively withdraw military represen-
tations from civilian bodies.21 In May 2004, Turkey removed the phrase,
“selected by General Staff,” from Article 131 of the Constitution by Act No.
5170.22 In the reasoned decision of legislative proposal, the motive for the pro-
gress of deciding to remove CGS-selected member from CHE was stated as
demilitarizing the administration by preventing any military representative
in civilian institutions as recommended in the EU 2003 progress report.23
Thus, the motive for this progress is clearly stated as fulfilling the EU require-
ments for DCAF.
Regarding the third area, the EU has criticized the SMC decisions for being
outside the scope of judicial review. The SMC is an administrative and advi-
sory board in Turkey, established by Law No. 1612 of 1972 to function during
peacetime. Its members include the Prime Minister, the CGS, the defense
minister, commanders of the ground and air forces and the navy, army com-
manders, the gendarmerie general commander, the fleet admiral and all gen-
erals and admirals in the TAF.24 The Council has considerable duties in
making defense and security policy, such as providing feedback on the
main program and objectives of TAF and reviewing draft bills, by laws and
regulations related to the TAF.25 By TAF Personnel Law No. 926, SMC was
also given authority and responsibility for promoting and appointing generals
and admirals and dealing with the retirement of military officers.26 In this
way, SMC played a role in the formation of cadres in the TAF and in ensuring
ideological uniformity within the army.27 Actually, it was the only authority to
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expel the military personnel from the army. There was no second instance to
appeal and its decisions were outside the scope of judicial review.28
To address the concerns in this field, Turkey amended Article 125 of the
Constitution in 2010 by adding the phrase “recourse to judicial review shall
be available against all decisions taken by the Supreme Military Council
regarding expulsion from the armed forces except acts regarding promotion
and retiring due to lack of tenure.”29 The reasoned decision of the Article
12 of the legislative proposal 2/656 stated that the Council decisions being
outside the scope of judicial review were against the principle of equality,
defined in Article 1030 of the Constitution. Thus, Article 125 was amended
to strengthen democratic principles of equality by taking into consideration
comparative law enforcement and international conventions to which
Turkey is a signatory.31 The EU welcomed the constitutional amendment
on SMC as a step toward greater transparency:
Further to the 2010 constitutional amendments, decisions by the Supreme Mili-
tary Council concerning dismissals of military personnel have been opened to
civilian judicial review. Military officers dismissed from the army now have the
right to appeal against their dismissals and retire with benefits or to obtain
employment at a state institution.32
However, the SMC decisions regarding the promotions and retirements due
to lack of tenure are still outside the scope of judicial review and remain as
a major concern for the EU.33 In fact, decisions of the SMC, including
decisions regarding promotion and retirements, were open to judicial
review in pre-1982 period in Turkey. However, with the 1982 Constitution,
this provision was retreated arguing that it was stranding the hierarchical
structure of the army’ upper stage, especially when administrative jurisdiction
stayed an order on promotion decisions.34 The TAF might have also sup-
ported the argument that judicial review on decisions regarding promotion
and retirements would weaken the military discipline of the armed forces.35
Thus, the motive of 1982 sprit to leave the decisions of the Council outside
the scope of judicial review remained until today to prevent the hierarchical
structure and military discipline of the armed forces. In other words,
despite the progress in DCAF, not all SMC decisions are opened to civilian
judicial review and the main motive for this shortcoming is stated as prevent-
ing the weakening of military discipline and its hierarchical structure. Here,
the second objective of DCAF in Turkey, namely protecting military power
from political abuse, is observed. Thus, the motive for this shortcoming is
mainly the goal of preserving a degree of authority for military despite the
reforms on DCAF, especially over internal matters such as promotions and
retirements.
Regarding the last criticism, the EU required Turkey to establish an
Ombudsmanship to increase the democratic political control over military.
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As a progress, Turkey established the institution of Ombudsman in 2012.
However, as a shortcoming, the acts of TAF, which are purely of military
nature has remained outside the competence of the Institution.36 In 2012 pro-
gress report, not surprisingly, the EU criticized the Law on the Ombudsman
as covering only administrative acts of the TAF and excluding their military
acts.37
The motive in establishing an Ombudsman was clearly stated in the
reasoned decision as the EU requirements and Turkey’s harmonization
efforts.38 On the other hand, the motive for the shortcoming of limiting its
military competence is found in the relevant parliamentary minutes. Accord-
ing to the CGS, services like training, maneuver, military exercises and guard
duty are acts of purely military nature and an ombudsman with a full compe-
tence over all military issues would cause serious disciplinary problems.39 In
their opinion on the law, representatives from TAF and Defense Ministry
argued that the problems experienced in administrative justice do not
usually occur in military justice and a full military competence for Institution
of Ombudsman including purely military issues is not necessary because
armed forces can solve many problems within its own mechanisms quite
fast.40 The news also supported the argument that it was TAF who demanded
the Constitutional sub-commission to leave the purely military issues outside
the competence of the Ombudsman.
As relevant parliamentary minutes show, opposition parties also criticized
the Law on the Ombudsman. Erol Dora Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve
Demokrasi Partisi) MP of Mardin criticized the above-mentioned arguments
of TAF and Ministry of Defense as incompatible with the principles of a
democratic state of law.41 The phrase of “purely military nature” was also cri-
ticized by Ali Özgündüz, Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
MP of Istanbul, who emphasized its uncertain context.42 As a response,
Burhan Kuzu, head of the parliamentary Constitution Commission stated
that most of the democratic countries except Sweden and Finland put the
military issues out of ombudsman competence as Turkey has also done.43
In fact, one can observe different ombudsman mechanisms with changing
oversight mechanisms in Europe, namely mechanisms of independent mili-
tary oversight, integrated military oversight and civilian oversight.44
Turkish model of ombudsman seems to be a mechanism of civilian oversight.
The main problem with this model is that it “may lack the necessary expertise
for dealing with the defense sector and may fail to focus attention on the par-
ticular problems facing military personnel.”45 Reminding the second objective
of the understanding of DCAF in Turkey as preventing the political abuse of
military power, Turkey might also have similar reservations towards a civilian
ombudsman with a full military competence. Thus, similar to the reservations
in SMC decisions regarding promotions and retirements, it was again the
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motive of allowing military to have a degree of authority over its internal
matters, strategic issues and military doctrine within the scope of DCAF.
Constitutional and legislative structure
Regarding the norm of constitutionally established authority vested with
democratic legitimacy, the EU has provided criticisms in three areas,
namely concerns on National Security Council (NSC), on the role and
duties of TAF and on the duality in Turkish jurisdiction. As being predecessor
of the NSC, Supreme Defense Assembly was founded for national mobiliz-
ation issues. With the 1961 Constitution, the Assembly continued to
operate under the name of NSC. According to the 1961 Constitution, the
Council consisted of the Prime Minister, the CGS, the Ministers of National
Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army,
Navy, and the Air Force, and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie
under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.46 Its duty was
defined as to “communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to
the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of
decisions related to national security and coordination.”47 However Article
118 of the 1982 Constitution widened its scope of duty from “recommending”
to “submitting views” and stated that its decisions shall be given “priority
consideration.”48
Regarding the concerns on NSC, the EU has criticized its existence as an
undemocratic mechanism:
[t]he recommendations of the NSC are not legally binding, but have a strong
influence on government policy. The existence of this body shows that,
despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish constitution allows the
Army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political life. (… )
[NSC] demonstrates the major role played by the army in political life. The
army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act
without the government’s knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale
repressive military operations.49
The regular reports in 199950 and 200051 continued stressing the crucial role
military played in Turkish politics through NSC decisions, statements or
recommendations. As a response, Turkey amended Article 118 in October
2001, as a part of the constitutional reform package. The number of civilians
in the formation of the Council was increased by the inclusion of deputy
prime ministers and the minister of justice.52 The advisory nature of the
body was also emphasized and its role was limited to giving recommen-
dations, as it had been in the 1961 Constitution. In the general reasoned
decision, the general motive for the constitutional reform package in
2001, in which progress on NSC was also included, is clearly stated as
EU harmonization efforts.53
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According to European Parliament, despite all the reforms on the NSC, the
real need for a civil democracy in Turkey is the total abolishment of NSC
rather than reforming it:
In the context of state reform, it will be necessary in the long term to abolish the
National Security Council in its current form and position in order to align civi-
lian control of the military with practice in EU Member States; realizes that the
desired structural change will be very hard to accept.54
Regarding the second area of criticism, the EU has concerns regarding the role
and duties of the TAF mainly because of the broad possibilities in interpreting
the laws and regulations, especially TAF Internal Service Law, Internal Service
Regulation and NSC Law that were regarded as potentially providing military
a wide range of maneuver.55Article 35 of the TAF Internal Service Law states
its duty as to “protect and preserve the Turkish motherland and the Republic,
the characteristics of which are defined in the constitution.”56 Article 85 of the
Internal Service Regulation states that “[TAF] shall defend the country against
the internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.”57 Article 2a
of the NSC Law defines the national security as:
The protection of the constitutional order of the State, its nation and integrity,
all of its interests in the international sphere including political, social, cultural
and economic interests, as well as the protection of its constitutional law against
all internal and external threats.58
While the provisions in Article 85 of the TAF Internal Service Regulation and
Article 2a of the NSC Law remain unamended, Turkey amended the Article
35 of the TAF Internal Service Law in July 2013 and put greater emphasis
on threats from outside:
The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against
threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and
strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to
fulfill the duties abroad with the decision of the Parliament and help maintain
international peace.59
Another progress was the amendment of Article 43 of the Internal Service
Law. Rather than emphasizing the nonpolitical role of military in an indirect
way, the new text openly states, “the members of [TAF] can not engage in pol-
itical activities.”60 The motive for these reforms was stated in the general
reasoned decision as preventing the possibility of interpreting duty of TAF
in a way to justify for military interventions.61 Thus, it might be argued
that the main motive for the amendments in Article 35 and Article 43 was
strengthening democracy in Turkey.
Third area of criticism on the constitutional and legislative structure is
duality in jurisdiction, namely the authority of military jurisdiction besides
the civilian one. Regarding the concerns on the duality of jurisdiction, the
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EU first criticized the trial of civilians before military courts.62 According to
Article 145 of the Constitution, military courts had jurisdiction “to try non-
military persons for military offences specified in the special law; and for
offences committed while performing their duties specified by law, or
against military personnel on military places specified by law.”63 As a
response, Turkey added the following phrase to Article 3 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code in 2009. “In peacetime, investigations of non-military persons
are conducted by public prosecutors and prosecutions by the judicial
courts”64 Turkey continued to make progress on the trial of non-military
persons by the civilian courts through amending Article 145 of the Consti-
tution in 2010.65 The new text reads as “non-military persons shall not be
tried in military courts, except during a state of war.”66
Meanwhile the EU also required a limitation of “the jurisdiction of military
courts to military duties of military personnel.”67 To that end, Turkey
amended Article 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 2009 as “the pro-
visions relating to the person under the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court’s judgment and provisions relating to the duties of military
court in case of war [before amendment: including war] and martial military
court are reserved.”68 Thus, the new text empowered criminal courts for mili-
tary personnel and limited the jurisdiction of military courts only to the situ-
ations of war and martial law. However, the Constitutional Court annulled
and stopped the execution of Article 7 on the basis that it conflicted with the
constitutional provisions at that time.69 As a further progress, the Justice
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) government
amended Article 145 of the Constitution by adding in 2010 the following
phrase: “Cases regarding crimes against the security of the State, consti-
tutional order and its functioning shall be heard before the civil courts in
any case.”70 In 2012, Article 105(6) of Act No 6352 repealed Article 250 com-
pletely and removed the provision for the exceptional situations of war and
martial law that gave jurisdiction to military courts.71 Reasoned decision of
the legislative proposal 2/64 shows that the motive for the progress of prohi-
bition of civilian trials before military courts and of limiting the jurisdiction of
military courts to the military duties of military personnel was clearly the pro-
spect of EU accession and Turkey’s attempts to fulfill the EU requirements
regarding the DCAF.72
The last EU criticism regarding the duality in jurisdiction is the existence of
military judges and their age qualification in the composition of Consti-
tutional Court.73 As a part of the 2010 constitutional reform package,
Turkey amended the composition of the Constitutional Court. According
to Article 146 of the original text, the Court shall be composed of 11
regular and 4 substitute members, all to be appointed by the President of
the Republic and 2 regular members to be selected from the Military High
Court of Appeals and from the High Military Administrative Court.74 With
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the inclusion of 2010 amendments, the Court is now composed of seventeen
regular members, of which 14 members to be appointed by the President of
the Republic and three of them by the TGNA. But two of the judges have
still to be selected from the Military High Court of Appeals and from the
High Military Administrative Court.75
The EU also criticized the continuing presence of military judges in the
Constitutional Court by stating that “[a]s constitutional jurisprudence in a
democratic system is a civilian matter, the presence of military judges is ques-
tionable.”76 Parliamentary minutes show that Burhan Kuzu, the head of the
parliamentary Constitution Commission, responded to the criticism by
arguing that members of the Court varied since the scope of the Court juris-
diction included various issues and top-level individuals, both from civilian
and military realms.77 Again, it might be argued that this shortcoming is
motivated by the goal of allowing military to preserve a degree of authority
over its internal matters through the existence of military judges in the Con-
stitutional Court in order to protect military power from political abuse of
insecure and incompetent politicians.
Regarding the second criticism on the duality in jurisdiction, the EU has
concerns on the age qualification of the Constitutional Court military
judges. Before the reforms on the formation of the Court, there was no
term limit for the judges; they were supposed to serve until their retirements
of age grounds. However, the amended Constitution provides termination of
the membership after 12 years. Considering the age qualification of at least 45
years when elected, the EU officials argue that, “military judges might return
to the military justice system when their term in the Constitutional Court
expires, which could raise questions about their impartiality as Constitutional
Court judges.”78
Reasoned decision of the legislative proposal shows that the motive to issue
a non-renewable term of 12 years is to renew the profile of Court judges in
accordance with the new social conditions and understandings.79 Thus, the
motive for this shortcoming is that it should have a better functioning consti-
tutional court, which should also be closely related with the efforts of
strengthening the democracy in Turkey.
Legislative approval of defense expenditures
Regarding the norm of legislative approval of defense expenditures, the EU
has had concerns on the full parliamentary control over the military
defense budget and expenditures since the TAF has little accountability to
the parliament in terms of defense and security matters.80 In Turkey,
armed forces has held financial autonomy since the beginning of the 1970s.
Following the 1971 military intervention, a constitutional amendment
limited the procedure of auditing defense expenditures by regulating it
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according to the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defense ser-
vices.81 As a further limitation, an amendment in the Article 30 of the Law
on the Court of Auditors following the 1980 coup excluded the military pur-
chase abroad and their contracts from the procedure of auditing.82 Article 160
of the 1982 Constitution continued the principle of secrecy for defense expen-
ditures, by stating that “the procedure for auditing, on behalf of the [TGNA],
of State property in possession of the Armed Forces shall be regulated by law
in accordance with the principles of secrecy required by National Defense.”83
In 2003, a new harmonization package was introduced, adding the follow-
ing provision by a new article to the Act. 832 of 1967 Law on the Courts of
Auditors:84
Auditing state property in the possession of the Armed Forces shall be observed
in accordance with the principles of secrecy required by National Defense. The
principles and procedures related to this auditing shall be regulated by bylaw
with “SECRET” secrecy level, prepared by the Ministry of National Defense
receiving opinion of General Staff and Court of Auditors and approved by
the [TGNA].
In fact, no significant amendment was brought out by the seventh harmoni-
zation package with regards to the auditing of state properties possessed by
the TAF. Since the principles of secrecy and the necessity of regulating the
procedure of auditing according to the requirements for national defense ser-
vices continued. The only positive step was to regulate the audit by a bylaw
instead of a law. However, during the preparation of the bylaw, the Court
of Auditors would give its opinion, together with the opinion of General
Staff. In other words, the procedure of auditing became dependent on the
request from the legislative body, not ipso facto and permanently.
The EU concerns on the restrictions provided by the Constitution for
auditing procedure of defense expenditure were finally adresses by the amend-
ment in Article 160 in 2004. The last paragraph of the article, “the principle of
secrecy required by National Defense,” was removed.85 Reasoned decision of
the legislative proposal openly stated that the motive for this progress is the
EU requirement for providing transparency in auditing state expenditures.86
The EU welcomed the constitutional amendment of 2004 as a greater gov-
ernmental control over military.87 However, it also stressed the importance of
full ex-ante parliamentary oversight over military expenditures and reminded
the need for adopting and implementing appropriate secondary legislation.88
As a response, in 2008, Court of Auditors in Turkey examined the question of
whether it has the mandate to audit the Defense Industry Support Fund
(DISF) and decided that there was legally no doubt that auditing DISF was
under the mandate of Court of Auditors.89 In 2010, the TGNA approved
Law No. 6085 on the Turkish Court of Auditors and expanded the auditing
scope of the military expenditure. Further, Article 4/ç of the law enabled
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the auditing of military tenders, military assets and expenditure as in the other
public institutions by Article 4/ç: “[Court of Auditors] audits all public funds,
resources and accounts, including special budgets, regardless of whether or
not they rank among the public administration budgets.”90 In other words,
since the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries is an agency with special
budgets attached to the Ministry of Defense and DISF is under its disposal,
Law No. 6085 has taken the DISF into the scope of auditing.91 The same
law also states that Foundation for Strengthening the Armed Forces may
also be audited by the Court of Auditors based upon the request of TGNA.92
Reasoned decision of the legislative proposal shows that the motive for this
progress is again the EU requirement of getting institutions that use public
resources but have not come under the competence of Court of Auditors
audited.93 However, in its progress report in 2014, the EU has still criticisms
on the lack of a specialized committee within Parliament with technical exper-
tise to follow-up reports from the Court of Auditors and on the weakness of
the Court’s legal framework that prevents further progress on improving par-
liamentary oversight of military expenditure.94
Conclusion
The degree and type of political control over military might change depending
on the system of government, historical traditions and cultural values.95 Since
the EU does not have a definitive guideline for DCAF, based on similar
reasons, the article accepts three norms stated in the CSCE Budapest Declara-
tion as the EU standards for DCAF. These assumed standards are also in par-
allel with the EU requirements on Turkey for DCAF, namely democratic
political control over military, constitutional and legislative structure and leg-
islative approval of defense expenditures. Thus, this article categorized the EU
requirements and criticisms on DCAF in Turkey according to these three
norms.
By questioning the main motives for Turkey’s progress and shortcomings
in DCAF reforms, this article first identified the EU requirements and criti-
cisms regarding Turkey and then examined Turkey’s reforms in each category
of norms. Further, the article sought to find out the official motives for the
progress and shortcomings of the DCAF reform process by tracing the parlia-
mentary minutes and reasoned decisions of the legislative proposals for
reforms. Last, the article aimed to answer how to enable a reform process
for the shortcomings as it has been achieved in other progress areas.
The article found out two official motives for Turkey’s progress in DCAF:
First, the “EU factor” as widely argued in the literature and second, Turkey’s
democratization efforts. Regarding the first norm of CSCE Budapest Declara-
tion, democratic political control over military, four progress areas were
identified. Above-mentioned two motives equally shared the influence on
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the progress areas. Two were motivated by the “EU factor” and while the
others by democratization. In terms of the second norm, constitutional and
legislative structure, the “EU factor” motivated four of the seven progress
areas. Regardig the last norm of the Declaration, legislative approval of
defense expenditures, the only motive appeared as the “EU factor” for the
two progress areas. In sum, the article identified 13 progress areas, of which
8 were motivated by the “EU factor.” Thus, it might be argued that EU acces-
sion prospect and Turkey’s harmonization efforts on EU requirements pri-
marily motivated Turkey to conduct reforms on DCAF and
democratization remained as secondary motive.
The article identified one main motive for the shortcomings on DCAF
reform process in Turkey, namely the need of allowing a degree of authority
for military within DCAF in order to prevent political abuse of military power.
In other words, the primary motive “EU factor” has not sufficiently motivated
Turkey to overcome the shortcomings, which have been justified by Turkey’s
understanding of DCAF, despite the existence of the secondary motive,
namely democratization.
The reasoned decisions of legislative proposals and parliamentary minutes
of the legislative proposals show that the main motive for the following pro-
gresses in DCAF reforms was the prospect of EU accession and Turkey’s
efforts to fulfill the requirements:
. Change in the NSC composition in favor of civilians in 2001 (second
norm).
. Limitation of the NSC role to recommendations in 2001 (second norm).
. Removal of military representatives in CHE in 2004 (first norm).
. Provision of transparency in auditing state spending by removing the prin-
ciple of secrecy required by National Defense in 2004 (third norm).
. Prevention of military jurisdiction to civilians in 2009 (second norm).
. Limiting the jurisdiction of military courts to the military duties of military
personnel in 2010 (second norm).
. Expansion of the auditing scope of military by including special budgets in
2010 (third norm).
. Establishment of the Institution of Ombudsman in 2012 (first norm).
The following reforms were motivated by the secondary motive of
strengthening of democratic principles in Turkish politics such as rule of
law and principle of equality:
. Opening of the SMC decisions to judicial review in 2010 (first norm).
. Age qualification for appointment and termination of the Constitutional
Court membership after 12 years (second norm-Turkey defines it as a pro-
gress while the EU regards it as a shortcoming).
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. Agreement among political parties in principle on accountability of CGS to
Ministry of Defense in draft constitution in 2013 (first norm).
. Amendment in duty of armed forces in 2013 (second norm).
. Prevention of TAFmembers engaging in political activities in 2013 (second
norm).
Though secondary, the existence of the motive of democratization is an
encouragement for Turkey’s reform process on DCAF, since the natural
motive for DCAF reforms seems to be democratization. In other words, its
existence as a second motive provides a prospect for further reforms on
DCAF process.
Besides those mentioned above, Turkey still has several shortcomings
despite the motives of “EU factor” and strengthening of democratic principles.
Tracing of parliamentary minutes and reasoned decisions of legislative propo-
sals shows that there is one major motive for the shortcomings in Turkey’s
DCAF reforms, namely the goal of allowing military to have authority over
its internal matters, strategic issues and military doctrine. This is mainly sup-
ported by the objective of protecting military from the political abuse as it
might be observed in the following shortcomings:
. Leaving SMC decisions on promotion and retirements due to lack of tenure
outside the scope of judicial review (first norm).
. Putting purely military issues outside the military competence of the
Ombudsman (first norm).
. Continuing existence of two military judges in the Constitutional Court
(second norm).
It might be observed that all shortcomings reflect the goal of preventing
military from political abuse, which is a part of the DCAF understanding of
Turkey. Regarding the first shortcoming, it is found that both lawmakers in
Turkey and the TAF argued that judicial review of SMC decisions regarding
promotion and retirements would weaken the military discipline of the armed
forces. For the second shortcoming, the parliamentary minutes of the relevant
legislative proposals show that the establishment of ombudsman mechanism
without military competence on purely military issues is justified by the need
of preserving military discipline and protecting military from political abuse
of incompetent civilians. Last, the existence of two military judges in the Con-
stitutional Court is justified by the need of protecting military from political
abuse of incompetent civilians, as stated by Burhan Kuzu, head of the Parlia-
mentary Constitution Commission in 2010.
Through the analysis of reasoned decisions of related legislative proposals
and tracing of parliamentary minutes of the reform processes, the article
identified two official motives for progress in DCAF: the “EU factor” and
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democratization. However, none of these has motivated Turkey to overcome
the shortcomings in DCAF. The main reason for this failure is identified as the
goal of protecting authority for military within DCAF. It might be well argued
that Turkey justifies the coexistence of shortcomings within DCAF and its
motive of democratization since its understanding of DCAF has two objec-
tives. First, preventing military intervention to the political agenda and
second, preventing the political abuse of military power. Thus, it seems that
Turkey might be motivated to overcome these shortcomings only when its
understanding of DCAF details a full subordination of military to civilian
authority.
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